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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
EDWIN BIRDHAND LEHI 
Defendant/Appellant 
:
 Appeals Court No. 20040260-CA 
Trial Court No. 0017-85 
:
 Priority No. 6 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by §78-2a-3(2)(e) Utah Code Ann., which grants 
the Utah Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction to review "appeals from a court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital 
felony. 
Defendant/Appellant, Edwin Birdhand Lehi was convicted of Count 1: Driving Under 
the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs (with priors), in violation of §41-6-44, Utah Code Ann., a 
third degree felony; Count 2: Driving on Suspended or Revoked Operator's License, in violation 
of §53-3-227(3)(a) Utah Code Ann., a class B misdemeanor; Count 3: No Registration, in 
violation of §41-la-1303(l), Utah Code Ann., a class C misdemeanor. 
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ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the trial court violated the defendant's due process and jury trial rights when it 
failed to adequately instruct the jury on the definition of reasonable doubt. Pgs. 115,116,117, 
132, 133,153,154. RR: 140; 156. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law is reviewable under a correction of 
error standard, with no particular deference given to the trial court's ruling." State v. Reyes, 84 
P.3d 841 (Utah App. 2004) quoting State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232,1244 (Utah 1993). 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
All statutes, rules and constitutional provisions referenced in this brief are set forth in the 
Addenda attached hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 25,2000, Defendant was charged with Count 1: Driving Under the Influence 
of Alcohol and/or Drugs (with priors), in violation of §41-6-44, Utah Code Ann. a third degree 
felony; Count 2. Driving on Suspended or Revoked Operator's License, in violation of §53-3-
227(3)(a), Utah Code Ann., a class B misdemeanor; Count 3. No Registration, in violation of 
§41-la-1303(l), Utah Code Ann., a class C misdemeanor. 
On September 5, 2000, the District Court found that Defendant was indigent and 
appointed a public defender to represent him. Preliminary hearing was held on September 11, 
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2000; Defendant was bound over to the District Court to answer the charges filed against him. 
On January 2, 2001, Defendant failed to appear and a warrant of arrest was issued. 
On November 28, 2001, Defendant was transported by law enforcement from Hobbs, 
New Mexico to Monticello, Utah. Defendant's jury trial was scheduled for January 2, 2002. 
On January 8,2002, Defendant entered a guilty plea to Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol with Priors, a third degree felony. Defendant was committed to the Utah State Prison on 
February 6,2002. On March 5,2002, Defendant filed a Motion to Withdraw his Plea, based 
upon the court's failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. The Court denied Defendant's motion; Defendant appealed and his conviction was 
reversed and the matter was remanded to the District Court. See: State v. Lehi, 73 P.3d 985 
(Utah App. 2003). 
On March 19, 2004, Defendant was tried before a jury. Defendant requested the court to 
instruct the jury using the reasonable doubt instruction set forth in State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 
1219 (Utah 1997), discussed in State v. Reyes, 84 P.3d 841 (Utah App. 2004), however, the court 
refused to do so. The defendant was convicted on all three counts as charged. Defendant waived 
time for sentencing; he was again committed to the Utah State Prison. 
FACTS 
On August 25, 2000 at about 8:20 a.m. Defendant Edwin Lehi, ("Lehi") and his 
companion, Dustin Yellow, ("Yellow") stopped into the Shirt Tail Convenience Store in 
Blanding Utah and purchased a 12-pack of beer. Pg. 60. An hour and a half later, Lehi and 
Yellow returned to the store. Pg. 61. 
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Upon their return, witness, store clerk, Jeff Rogers ("Rogers") heard some screeching of 
tires in the parking lot. Rogers, leaned over the counter and looked out through the window. Pg, 
61. Driver, Lehi was trying to back up a little bit, apparently trying to pull up to a gas pump. 
Lehi couldn't get lined up, he was headed more towards a support pole for the canopy. Pg. 62. 
After a couple of tries, Lehi was able to get his truck lined up with the gas pump and was able to 
put gas in his truck. Pg. 74. Lehi did not kill [the engine]. He was "just kinda poppin' the 
clutch and jerkin' it. Stompin' on the brake. And the vehicle would lurch back and forth a little 
bit. Just not gettin' things coordinated." Pg. 62. When Lehi got out of the vehicle and started 
pumping gas. He was "havin' a hard time doin' that." Pg. 63. Lehi had coordination problems. 
"[A]fter he got the gas goin' into the pickup, he was standin' there and he could not quite hold 
himself." Pg. 63. Rogers called the Sheriffs Office. Pg. 63. 
Yellow came in to pay for the gas, which turned out to be more than he was willing or 
able to pay for. Yellow went outside to talk to Lehi and they got into an argument. Pg. 66. 
Yellow purchased the beer, but he told Lehi, "I'm not gonna pay for the gas." Pg. 84. Lehi was 
mad at Yellow because Yellow did not want to pay for the gas. Pg. 94. They came inside the 
store and continued with their argument. Lehi verbally threatened Yellow, using colorful 
language. Pgs. 66, 67. Lehi was not physically aggressive. Pg. 67. The argument between 
Lehi and Yellow "just remained at words." Pg. 73. 
Rogers observed that Lehi's eyes had "kind of a lost look, a little bit of a glazed look," 
his face was relaxed and he was weaving. Rogers called the Sheriff again. Pg. 68. Lehi thought 
Rogers called the police because he couldn't pay for the gas. Pg. 100. 
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While in llie stoic, I dti was aMe statu! - >n his own, Ik" did n< 4 brace himself on anything, 
he stood in the middle of the store's entry where there is nothing to reach. Pg. 70. Lehi could 
have walked over to the counter and leaned on it, but he did not. IV 7.1. 
When Sheriff Lacey arrived, he detected a very strong odoi oi alcohol Pg 77. I ehi 
admitted that he had drunk a 12-pack of beer and he refused to take the field sobriety tests. Pg. 
78. The Sheriffs report does not indicate that I ehi said wfi m lie had consumed the 12 pack Pg. 
96. Lehi maintained that he had a 12 pack of beer to drink the night before the incident, but he 
agreed that he had not told the Sheriff that he was drinking the beer the night before the incident 
rather than the day of the incident. Pgs. 105, 107. Lehi also said that he had not showered that 
morning. Pg, KM Sheriff Lacey transported Lehi to the jail. Enroute to the jail, Sheriff Lacey 
observed that Lehi seemed like he had a "thick tongue" when he spoke. Pg. 79. 
Upon arrival at the jail, Lehi had a "real rough time gainin' his balance." Sheriff Lacey 
helped Lehi by the elbow to make sure he didn't fall to (lie:)»iouii< 1 IV n(} 1 ehi said (hal hi 
had knee surgery and that his leg cramps up when he sits in one place for a while, that is why he 
was stiff when he
 finivnl ;i( fhr mil Vlei ;i '," '\ mile ink \\ ifh Sheriff I  .u e\ IV 102 I ehi was 
given the opportunity to take the breathalyzer test, he refused. Pg. 79. 
Defendant »i.*qik^ U\1 that *' **.• * "»uM j»i\c (JR1 UNVMUIU Me doubt instruction as discussed in 
State v. Reyes, 84 P.3d 841 (Utah App.2004). The discussion proceeded as follows: 
Rogers: Yeah. The only one that I had concerning that in 
your Utah ones, was the reasonable doubt, because we have a new 
case that came out that had a little bit of additional language. So it 
would just be my reasonable doubt in that. Fd ask you to look at 
it 
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Court: What's the difference? 
Rogers: Ah, it was—I think it was obviate all— 
Halls: Obviate all reasonable doubt? 
Rogers: Yeah. May I approach? I just-I have a case for 
you. It's State v. [Reyes]. It was, ah, not a huge change, but it was 
a little change. And that was based on the last set of jury 
instructions that I'd had in this court. 
Court: So now we have got to use the word obviate. 
Rogers: Yes. 
Court: That will add great clarity to the -to the process. 
Rogers: Ha-ha. Ha-ha. 
Halls: Your Honor, I haven't read that case, but is it -I 
mean do we -do we have to? Are they saying that -that that was 
an error in that case, because they didn't say? Pg. 115,116. 
Court: Well, I—I'm sure what they really mean is it has to 
-it has to somewhere state that you have to go beyond reasonable 
doubt. Ah, there's three parts that you have to have must obviate 
all reasonable doubt. And I suppose they would permit us to use 
more language that is more likely to be intelligible to lay persons. 
Ah, and then - and then we are not supposed to have this 
weighty matter -weighty affairs of life thing. I think we took that 
out a long time ago because, you know, lots of times, in your 
weighty affairs of life, you still have to decide one - one or the 
other. And -the burden can just be a preponderance of the 
evidence in those -in that situation. 
Ah, and -and we're not supposed to say that a reasonable 
doubt is not just a possibility. 
But you can say it's wholly speculative possibility. 
Halls: What's the date on this case -
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Court' Hi is i:asc, .ill, well— 
Rogers: It's -
Court It -it -it interprets a 1989 case -no—a 199 7 case, ah--
Pg 116. 
Rogers: It's a-a.— 
Court: -but it's but it's a 19—2000—it -it interprets a 
1997 Supreme court case, but it's a 2004 Court of Appeals case. 
I'm not sure what it says. 
What was the instruction in t h e -
Rogers: (inaudible) 
Halls: W e l l -
Court Well-
Halls: -okay. It's good to know the) "ve cleared up the 
reasonable doubt instruction. Ha-ha ha. 
Rogers: Ha-ha-ha. 
Court: I think this case got reversed because it didn't meet 
-oh, this is fascinating. 
Rogers: I la-ha ha. 
Court: The Supreme Court agrees that the court -or the 
Court of Appeals agrees that the Utah Supreme Court is probably 
wrong, in view of what the U. S. Supreme Court said, but the 
Court of Appeals can't tell the Utah - can't overrule the Utah 
Supreme Court. Pg. 117. 
Court: Now on the obviate question, I -it, ah -I think 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt, to say that it is the same as 
saying the State - if you say the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you're also saying the State - if you say the 
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. You're also saying 
the State must obviate all reasonable doubt. But if that doesn't do 
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it, then the language - then my instruction which says "and it has 
to be enough to eliminate reasonable doubt" is sufficient to cover 
that requirement Robertson. Pgs. 132,133. 
The court refused to instruct the jury on reasonable doubt as requested by Defendant, stating: 
"I'm going to make a record that while we were waiting for 
the eighth juror to show up, we had -I just visited casually with the 
jurors about some of the experience I'd had, and then I asked if any 
of them knew the meaning of the word obviate. None of them did. 
None of the seven. 
And although I'm pretty sure they would understand what 
it meant, when used in context, if a word is so terribly important to 
use, it ought to add to understanding, not have to have its meaning 
drawn from the surrounding context. And that's why I think it is a 
mistake to insist on the use of that word. And I cannot believe 
that the Court of Appeals insists that I use that word instead of a 
more understandable word like eliminate. Pgs. 153 and 154. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court violated the defendant's due process and jury trial rights because it failed 
to adequately instruct the jury on the definition of reasonable doubt. 
In State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court articulated a 
three part test for reviewing the appropriateness of a reasonable doubt instruction. State v. Reyes, 
84 P.3d 841 (Utah App. 2004). 
First, "the instruction should specifically state that the State's proof 
must obviate all reasonable doubt." Second, the instruction should 
not state that a reasonable doubt is one which "would govern or 
control a person in the more weighty affairs of life." Third, "it is 
appropriate to instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a 
possibility [.]" Id-
Defendant asked the court to instruct the jury as follows: 
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A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant 
throughout the trial. If a defendant's guilt is not proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute 
certainty. It is the burden of the State to obviate all reasonable 
doubt. Reasonable doubt is based on reason, which is reasonable 
in view of all the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based 
on fancy, imagination, or wholly speculative possibility. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof to satisfy the mind, or 
convince the understanding of those bound to act conscientiously, 
and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is 
a doubt that reasonable people would entertain based upon the 
evidence in the case. RR. 156. 
The trial court declined to instruct the jury that "the State's proof must obviate all reasonable 
doubt" as specifically required by State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997) and State v. 
Reyes, 84 P.3d 841 (Utah App.2004). After reviewing Robertson as discussed in State v. Reyes 
the court stated: 
Court: Now on the obviate question, I -it, ah -I think proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, to say that it is the same as saying the 
State - if you say the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, 
you're also saying the State must obviate all reasonable doubt. 
But if that doesn't do it, then the language - then my instruction 
which says "and it has to be enough to eliminate reasonable doubt" 
is sufficient to cover that requirement. Robertson. Pgs. 132, 133. 
The Court also stated: 
"I'm going to make a record that while we were waiting for 
the eighth juror to show up, we had -I just visited casually with the 
jurors about some of the experience I'd had, and then I asked if any 
of them knew the meaning of the word obviate. None of them did. 
None of the seven. 
And although I'm pretty sure they would understand what 
it meant, when used in context, if a word is so terribly important to 
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use, it ought to add to understanding, not have to have its meaning 
drawn from the surrounding context. And that's why I think it is a 
mistake to insist on the use of that word. And I cannot believe 
that the Court of Appeals insists that I use that word instead of a 
more understandable word like eliminate. Pgs. 153 and 154. 
Based on the foregoing, the court instructed the jury as follows: 
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant 
throughout the trial. If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted. 
The state must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute 
certainty. Reasonable doubt is based on reason, which is 
reasonable in view of all the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a 
doubt based on fancy, imagination, or wholly speculative 
possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof to 
satisfy the mind, or convince the understanding of those bound to 
act conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt. A 
reasonable doubt is a doubt that reasonable people would entertain 
based upon the evidence in the case. RR. 140 
The instruction given by the court fails to meet the first test set forth in Robertson. 
ARGUMENT 
The reasonable doubt jury instruction must comport with the three part test set forth in 
State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997) and discussed in State v. Reyes, 84 P.3d 841 
(Utah Court of Appeals 2004), to wit: First, "the instruction should specifically state that the 
State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt." Second, the instruction should not state 
that a reasonable doubt is one which "would govern or control a person in the more weighty 
affairs of life." Third, "it is appropriate to instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a 
possibility [.]" Id. (emphasis added.) 
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The trial court refused to instruct the jury that "the State's proof must obviate all 
reasonable doubt." Instead, the trial court instructed: "the state must prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt." The trial court was aware of the standard set forth in Robertson and the 
discussion of Robertson in Reyes. The Utah Supreme Court made it clear that the court "should 
specifically state that tcthe State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt." 
The trial court justified its decision not to follow the law regarding the reasonable doubt 
instruction because of the Judge's casual visit "with the jurors about some of the experience [the 
Judge] had, and then [the Judge] asked if any of [the jurors] knew the meaning of the word 
obviate. None of them did. None of the seven." Pgs. 153,154. 
The court stated: [A]lthough I'm pretty sure they would understand what [obviate] 
meant, when used in context, if a word is so terribly important to use, it ought to add to 
understanding, not have to have its meaning drawn from the surrounding context. And that's 
why I think it is a mistake to insist on the use of that word. And I cannot believe that the Court 
of Appeals insists that I use that word instead of a more understandable word like eliminate." 
Pgs. 153 and 154. 
According to Webster's New World Dictionary: 
eliminate is defined as: "to get rid of; remove; to leave out of 
consideration; omit." 
obviate is defined as: "to do away with or prevent by effective measures; 
make unnecessary." 
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The word "eliminate" appears to be synonymous with the word "obviate" and the trial 
court's opinion that the word "eliminate" can, and should be substituted for the word "obviate" 
may have some merit because the definition of the word eliminate may be more easily 
understood that the definition of the word obviate. However, the trial court did not substitute 
the word "obviate" with the word "eliminate." Instead, it failed to instruct the jury that it is "the 
burden of the State to obviate/ eliminate all reasonable doubt." The court instead instructed the 
jury: "The state must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" Robertson clearly states: "First, 
the instruction should specifically state that the State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt." 
The instruction given by the trial court is not an accurate statement of the law. 
A trial court has the duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the case. 
The trial court's reasonable doubt instruction failed to comport with the requirements of the 
three-part test set forth in Robertson and constituted a structural error requiring reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant prays that this court will vacate his conviction and 
remand this matter to the District Court for further proceedings. 
[end of document signature page to follow] 
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DATED on this £ day of August, 2004. 
Yh&wuL /u Q*Y^ 
KRISTINE M. ROGERS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, KRISTINE M. ROGERS, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered ten copies 
of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 S. State, 5th Floor, P.O. Box 
140210, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's 
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 14054, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114-0854, this _ 3 _ day of August, 2004. 
KRISTINE M.ROGERS J 
DELIVERED this _v3 day of August, 2004. 
UfLuS l<SAA/mM0fK?(W^ 
13 
ADDENDA 
Tab A 
-ILED 
B* 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
EDWIN BIRDHAND LEHI, 
Defendant. 
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER 
OF COMMITMENT TO 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
Case No. 0017-85 
MARCH 19, 2004 
HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON 
Plaintiff Attorney: Craig C. Halls 
Defendant Attorney: Kristine M. Rogers 
This being the day and hour fixed for pronouncing judgment 
in this case, and the defendant being present in court and 
represented by counsel and defendant having been adjudged guilty 
of the following offenses: 
COUNT 1: DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS, a 
Third Degree Felony; COUNT 2: DRIVING ON SUSPENDED OR REVOKED 
OPERATOR'S LICENSE, a Class B Misdemeanor; and COUNT 3: NO 
REGISTRATION, a Class C Misdemeanor; and the defendant stating to 
the court that there is no legal reason why judgment should not 
be pronounced, the court now pronounces the judgment and sentence 
of the law as follows, to wit: That the defendant, EDWIN BIRDHAND 
MAR 2 v 2. Jt 
C L E R K O P T H L C >J'il 
D--M 
«P 
LEHI, be imprisoned in the UTAH STATE PRISON for a term not to 
exceed FIVE (5) YEARS on Count 1, SIX (6) MONTHS on Count 2 and 
NINETY (90) DAYS on Count 3, to be served concurrently. 
The defendant is hereby remanded to the custody of the San 
Juan County Sheriff or other proper officer to be transported to 
the Utah State Prison. 
DATED t h iS J2ML day of March, 2 004 
^ ^.&d* 
Anderso1 
)istrict Court Judge 
S&3&*' 
Craig C.^Halls 
San Juan County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / J day of March, 2004, I 
mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER OF COMMITMENT to Kristine M. Rogers, Attorney 
for the defendant at 712 Judge Building, 8 East Broadway, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84111; Adult Probation Department at 1165 South 
Highway 191 #3, Moab, UT 84532; and to the Department of 
Corrections, PO Box 250, Draper, UT 84020. 
CterkJ 
TabB 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 
Amendment V. 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation. 
Amendment VI. 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
TabC 
41-1A-1303. DRIVING WITHOUT REGISTRATION OR CERTIFICATE OF TITLE -
CLASS B OR C MISDEMEANOR. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3) or Section 41-la-211, it is a class C 
misdemeanor for a person to drive or move, for an owner knowingly to permit to be 
driven or moved upon any highway any vehicle of a type required to be registered in this 
state: 
(a) that is not registered or for which a certificate of title has not been issued or 
applied for; 
41-6-44. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL. 
(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this 
state if the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater as shown 
by a chemical test given within two hours after the alleged operation or physical 
control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of 
alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle. 
(6)(a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six years of two 
or more prior convictions under this section is a: 
(ii) third degree felony if at least: 
(A) three prior convictions are for violations committed after April 23, 
1990. 
53-3-227. DRIVING A MOTOR VEHICLE PROHIBITED WHILE DRIVING 
PRIVILEGE DENIED, SUSPENDED, DISQUALIFIED, OR REVOKED. 
(3)(a) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whose conviction under Subsection 
(1) is based on his driving a motor vehicle while the person's driving privilege is 
suspended, disqualified, or revoked for: 
(ii) a violation of Section 41-6-44. 
